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Article 5

Disputed Deductions: Delfino and the Fourth Circuit's
Prudent Adoption of the Restrictive Approach to Tax Evasion
Sentencing*
Justice Hugo Black famously remarked that "[t]he United States
has a system of taxation by confession. That a people so numerous,
scattered and individualistic annually assesses itself with a tax
liability, often in highly burdensome amounts, is a reassuring sign of
the stability and vitality of our system of self-government." 1 Justice
Black was certainly correct in asserting that the United States enjoys
a remarkably high compliance rate, as over eighty-six percent of
taxpayers properly report and file their federal income taxes.2
However, the primary motivator driving most Americans to diligently
pay their taxes is not sheer moral compulsion, but perhaps a more
visceral emotion-the unmitigated fear of audit and conviction for
tax-related offenses.' In recent years, audit rates have risen, and the
courts have imposed progressively steeper sentences for those
convicted of tax evasion, pushing taxpayer apprehension even higher.4
Recently, in United States v. Delfino,5 the U.S. Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit further reinforced this trend by ensuring that
those convicted of tax evasion receive even stricter sentences.6 In

* Copyright © 2008 by Timothy J. Coley.
1. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 36 (1953).
2. The compliance rate is the ratio of taxpayers who submit their federal income
taxes compared to the total number who should. I.R.S., REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX

GAP 1 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/tax-gap-report-final_080207_linked.pdf.
3. See, e.g., Posting of Judge Richard Posner, United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, to Becker-Posner Blog, http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/
2007/11/tafxevasionposn.html (Nov. 25, 2007, 16:16 EST) (commenting that taxpayers'
fear of punishment is a more compelling motivation for taxpaying than moral duty); see
also John T. Scholz & Neil Pinney, Duty, Fear,and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis
of Citizenship Behavior, 39(2) AM. J. OF POL. SCi. 490, 490-96 (1995) (examining

heuristically the relationship between taxpayer fear and compliance). But cf. Posting of
Gary Becker, University Professor, Department of Economics and Sociology and the
Graduate School of Business, University of Chicago, to Becker-Posner Blog,
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2007/11/why-solittle-t.html (Nov. 25, 2007,
16:51 EST) (arguing the importance of moral duty).
4. See infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text.
5. 510 F.3d 468 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 07-1273, 2008 WL 972703 (U.S. Oct.
6,2008).
6. Id. at 473.
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rejecting its prior approach,7 the Fourth Circuit held that, for
sentencing purposes, convicted tax evaders are not allowed the
benefit of unclaimed deductions that would otherwise have the effect
of reducing their sentences under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines").8 This holding is significant because the
federal courts have been split over the proper role of deductions in
sentencing formulations ever since a series of ambiguous amendments
to the Guidelines was enacted in 1993 ("'93 Amendments"). 9
Accordingly, this Recent Development will argue that, as evidenced
by the Fourth Circuit's Delfino decision, a pronounced trend has
emerged among the federal circuits toward the disallowance of
deductions in the calculation of sentences for tax-related convictions.
First, this Recent Development will discuss the relevant tax- and
sentencing-related concepts behind this issue and will survey the
contrasting approaches taken by the federal courts, including the
historical contours of the current trend. Next, it will examine the
policy implications behind this shift and will conclude that the Fourth
Circuit's about-face was a prudent move, as its current approach is
more consonant with important policy considerations-namely,
administrability, retribution, deterrence, and the Guidelines' overall
objectives of consistency and stricter sentencing. Finally, this Recent
Development will recommend that the U.S. Sentencing Commission
adopt a revised amendment ("Revised Amendment") to the
Guidelines, which would codify the Fourth Circuit's current
approach, thereby promoting uniformity among the federal courts.
On April 27, 2006, in the Federal District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, James and Jeaniene Delfino were each convicted
on four counts of attempted evasion of income tax, mail fraud, and

7. See United States v. Schmidt, 935 F.2d 1440, 1450-51 (4th Cir. 1991) (allowing
defendants to claim deductions when calculating their sentences).
8. See Delfino, 510 F.3d at 473. The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were established
by the Federal Sentencing Commission with three purposes in mind: 1) ensuring that
sentences fulfill the theories underlying the criminal justice system, "i.e., just punishment,
deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation"; 2) reducing the "disparity among offenders
with similar characteristics convicted of similar criminal conduct, while permitting
sufficient judicial flexibility to take into account relevant aggravating and mitigating
factors"; and 3) to "reflect, to the extent practicable, advancement in the knowledge of
human behavior as it relates to the criminal justice process." U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
AN OVERVIEW

OF THE UNITED

STATES

SENTENCING

COMMISSION

1 (2008),

http://www.ussc.gov/general/USSC Overview_-200806.pdf; see also Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1976 (1984) (creating the United States
Sentencing Commission); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL

(containing the sentencing provisions regarding tax evasion).
9. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(c)(1) (1993).

§ 2T1.1 (2006)
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conspiracy to defraud the United States. ° By setting up a series of
fraudulent trusts and failing to file any personal tax returns between
the years of 1995 and 2001, the defendants deprived the federal
government of millions of dollars in tax revenue, enabling them to
"enjoy a lavish lifestyle, which included ...a half-million dollar house
with a pool and hot tub, numerous luxury autos, two race car[s], and a
motorcycle."" James Delfino was ultimately sentenced to a seventyeight month imprisonment, and Jeaniene Delfino received a sentence
of sixty-three months. 2
Contrary to binding precedent at the time, 3 the district court did
not allow the Delfinos to claim any deductions to which they would
have been entitled had they filed timely returns. 4 This departure was
particularly detrimental for the defendants because it resulted in a
period of incarceration roughly twenty-two to twenty-six months
longer than would have otherwise likely been ordered. 5
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit granted
the case certiorari 6 and on December 18, 2007, affirmed the
convictions, explicitly adopting the district court's sentencing
calculations.
Currently, the federal circuits fall into two camps regarding the
issue of deductions and sentencing: those adopting the restrictive
approach, disallowing unclaimed deductions; and those utilizing the
permissive approach, allowing deductions to be granted for
sentencing purposes. The court's holding in Delfino placed the
Fourth Circuit squarely in the restrictive camp-a marked departure
from the court's prior permissive approach. 8 Formerly, in United
States v. Schmidt, 9 the Fourth Circuit maintained that "it was error to
disallow deductions a defendant could have taken under U.S.S.G.

10. Initial Brief of Petitioners-Appellants at 7, Delfino, 510 F.3d 468 (No. 06-4506).
11. News Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice (Jan. 27, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/
usao/vae/Pressreleases/01-JanuaryPDFArchive/06/20060127delfinonr.pdf.
12. Initial Brief of Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 10, at 8-9.
13. United States v. Schmidt, 935 F.2d 1440, 1451 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
Guidelines require that defendants convicted of tax-related offenses be allowed to claim
deductions for sentencing purposes).
14. Initial Brief of Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 10, at 16.
15. The defendants claim that, if deductions had been allowed, they would have
received a sentence within the range of forty-one to fifty-one months, rather than the
current sixty-three to seventy-eight month range. Id. at 8.
16. See United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 468 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 071273, 2008 WL 972703 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008).
17. Id. at 473.
18. See id.
19. 935 F.2d 1440 (4th Cir. 1991).
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§ 2T1.3(a) (1989) ... [since] a fair reading of [the Guidelines]
supports ...punishing a crime whose gravity is represented by the
actual loss of tax revenue to the IRS. ' '2° In Delfino, this approach was
unambiguously rejected, with the court instead adopting the
restrictive approach and holding that an individual's attempted loss
was the proper measure.21
The difference between actual and attempted loss is an
important distinction for purposes of this Recent Development
because a court's adoption of either actual or attempted tax loss
coincides with its use of either the permissive or restrictive approach,
respectively. "Actual loss" is the amount of taxes the IRS could
normally collect from a taxpayer-essentially, ordinary taxes payable,
excluding any deductions, exemptions, or credits.2 2 "Attempted loss"
is the amount of "loss that would have resulted had the offense been
successfully completed. ' 23 Hence, a court applying the permissive
approach tends toward the use of actual tax loss because the IRS
would ordinarily only be able to collect nondeductible income.24 On
the other hand, those circuits utilizing the restrictive approach have
tended toward the application of attempted tax loss for the inverse
reason-the defendant attempted to conceal his entire gross income
from the government, and "unclaimed deductions should not be
taken into account because they have no relevance to the amount of
loss that the scheme attempted to produce., 25 Thus, in Delfino, the
Fourth Circuit declared that it will "no longer rely on Schmidt's
interpretation of [actual] tax loss under the sentencing guidelines,"
stating instead that the appropriate measure is "the attempted, or
intended loss. ' ' 26 Under this new approach, by failing to file tax
returns for the years 1995-2001, the Delfinos were deemed to have
20. See Delfino, 510 F.3d at 473 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (citing Schmidt, 935 F.2d at 1451).
21. Id. at 475.
22. United States v. Chavin, 316 F.3d 666, 677-78 (7th Cir. 2002).
23. United States v. Gordon, 291 F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir. 2002) (quoting U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(c)(1) (2001)); see also Chavin, 316 F.3d at
677-78 (explaining the difference between "actual" and "attempted" loss).
24. See, e.g., Gordon, 291 F.3d at 187-88 (utilizing an actual loss calculation and the
permissive approach).
25. Chavin, 316 F.3d at 677.
26. Delfino, 510 F.3d at 472 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Chavin, 316 F.3d at 667). Paradoxically, in Delfino, the Fourth Circuit held that
the change in language between the 1991 and 1993 Guidelines (i.e., the removal of
language requiring courts to disregard deductions and use attempted loss) allowed the
court to utilize attempted loss instead of actual loss. The court held that Schmidt was
based on the 1991 Guideline's language, so the court was no longer required to adhere to
Schmidt's (permissive) approach after the 1993 Amendments. Id. at 472-73.
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forfeited their ability to claim deductions, and the court refused to
reduce their sentences accordingly. 7

In general, the federal offense of tax evasion is a felony
punishable by up to $100,000 in fines or five years imprisonment. 8
To obtain a conviction for tax evasion, the government must establish
three elements beyond a reasonable doubt: (1) the existence of a tax
deficiency; (2) an affirmative act constituting an evasion or attempted
evasion of the tax; and (3) willfulness. 9 In order to detect financial
activity that is indicative of evasion and thereby worthy of an audit,
the IRS maintains an extensive network of databases consisting of
voluntary and employer-reported information.3" One's risk of audit is

highly dependent upon income. For instance, in the 2007 budget
year, a joint or individual filer's risk of IRS audit ("coverage," in IRS
terminology) ranged from one percent, for taxpayers in the lowest
income bracket, to roughly ten percent, for those in the highest.3 Not
only was this coverage rate the highest since the turn of the century,32
but the average sentence for those convicted of tax-related offenses
rose sharply in the corresponding years as well.33 Moreover, in recent
27. Id. at 473. To actually compute attempted tax loss, a court "need[s] to look no
further than [the] return to find the tax-loss figure." Chavin, 316 F.3d at 678. In essence, a
defendant's attempted tax loss is the amount he represented as income to the government.
However, if a defendant has not filed a return for the years in question, the IRS typically
appoints an auditor to examine the defendant's expenditures, paperwork, and other
records to try to calculate an accurate tax loss figure. See, e.g., Initial Brief of PetitionersAppellants, supra note 10, at 33-35 (testimony of former IRS auditor John Gordon).
28. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (2000).
29. Id.; see also Rebecca Leitman et al., Tax Evasion, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1017,
1019 (1996) (discussing the three elements of tax evasion). For examples of cases using an
elemental tax evasion definition, see United States v. Daraio, 445 F.3d 253, 258 (3d Cir.
2006) and United States v. Kaiser,893 F.2d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 1990).
30. The IRS maintains the "Enforcement Revenue Information System" (ERIS),
which "tracks assessments made, revenues collected, direct hours reported, and cost
incurred as a result of conducting Internal Revenue Service (IRS) enforcement activities."
I.R.S., Enforcement Revenue Information System, http://www.irs.gov/privacy/article/
0,,id=154532,00.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2008).
31. See Jim Abrams, The Beauty in Being Poor: IRS Audited I Out of Every 11
Millionaires... But Only I in 100 Earning$100,000 or Less, Jan. 17, 2008, availableat 2008
WLNR1159340. In the 2007 budget year, one out of every eleven millionaires was audited
and the coverage rate was nearly double that of the 2004 rate. Id. Commercial filers also
faced an increased coverage rate, with higher-earning businesses facing higher audit rates.
Id. Approximately one out of every six corporations with assets over $10 million faced an
audit. Id.
32. In 2000, the average individual audit rate across all tax brackets was a mere
0.49%, while in 2007, it was nearly double at 1.03%. I.R.S., FISCAL YEAR 2007 IRS
ENFORCEMENT AND SERVICE STATISTICS 3 (2007), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-news/
irsenforcement and service-tables-fy_2007.pdf.
33. The mean sentence for tax convictions has risen roughly thirty-one percent since
2000 (average sentence in year 2000: 10.8 months; average sentence in year 2007: 14.2
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years, the IRS has stepped up its prosecution and collection efforts,
specifically targeting those in the upper tax brackets.34
Together, these dynamics have created a perilous situation for
the less than scrupulous, or even less than meticulous, taxpayer,
particularly for those with higher incomes. The elevated coverage
and sentencing rates among high-income earners also demonstrate
the IRS's recent "aggressive" focus on prosecuting sophisticated,
high-value tax evasion schemes.35 Whereas the average middleincome taxpayer bases her tax decisions on some combination of
unverified assumptions and superstition,36 high-income tax evaders
often exhibit a great degree of sophistication and expertise through
tax evasion and avoidance schemes.3 7 These schemes, which currently

Compare U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2000 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS, at tbl.13, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/
2000/Table13.pdf, with U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, 2007 SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL
SENTENCING STATISTICS, at tbl.13, available at http://www.ussc.gov/ANNRPT/2007/
months).

Tablel3.pdf.
34. See Understandingthe Causes of and Solutions to Addressing the Federal Tax Gap:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 110th Cong. 5-6 (2006), http://budget.
senate.gov/democratic/testimony/2006/everson-taxgap02l506.pdf (written testimony of
Commissioner of Internal Revenue Mark Everson on the tax gap and how to solve it);
AppropriatedAccounts, Dep't of the Treasury-BUDGET IN BRIEF FY 2008, Jul. 19, 2007,
at 2, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroombudget-in-brief-2008.pdf.
35. See A Closer Look at the Size and Sources of the Tax Gap: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Taxation and IRS Oversight of the S. Comm. on Finance, 110th Cong. 15
(2006), available at http://www.senat-finance//hearings/testimony/2005test/072606rg.pdf
[hereinafter Subcomm. on Taxation Hearing] (statement of the Honorable J. Russell
George, Treasury Inspector General, Tax Administration); IRS Aggressively Audited High
Income Taxpayers, Businesses in 2007, According to Noted Chicago Tax Attorney
McKenzie, BUSINESS WIRE, Mar. 7, 2008, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi-mOEIN/
is_2008_March_7/ai n24379440.
36. See Frank A. Cowell, The Economic Analysis of Tax Evasion, 37 BULL. ECON.
RES. 163, 163 (1985) (noting that tax evasion is like pornography-it "seems to arouse a
mixture of outrage, guilty curiosity and incredulous admiration. It is an area about which
one knows little but suspects much.").
37. See id. at 167-72 (analyzing the incentives which lead to a taxpayer's decision to
evade or comply). A particularly egregious example of a sophisticated tax evasion scheme
was perpetrated by Wade Cook, a well-known financial "guru," famous for lecturing and
writing books on investment. In February 2007, Cook was convicted of tax evasion for
failing to report or pay any taxes on the $9.5 million in royalties he earned from selling
books and hosting seminars. The government proved that, in order to effectuate this tax
fraud, Cook funneled revenue into a fictitious partnership, aptly named "Never Ending
Wealth, LP," which was, in turn, owned by a tax-exempt, charitable trust. Cook used his
untaxed income to purchase "new cars, jewelry, and exotic Arabian horses for [his] ranch
... and spent $200,000 on a suite at Key Arena in Seattle." See Press Release, U.S.
Attorney's
Office,
Western
District
of
Washington
(Feb.
20, 2007),
http://www.usdoj.gov/tax/usaopress/2007/txdv07cook.html.
Cook was also convicted of
obstruction of justice for falsifying documents in an attempt to further conceal his assets.
Id.
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deprive the government of roughly $85 billion per annum, 38
essentially boil down to complex cost-benefit analyses-whereby the
prospective evaders weigh the potential benefits of evasion versus the
concomitant risk of detection and prosecution.39 By increasing the
risk of detection and average sentences, the IRS has further upped
the ante in this complicated wager. Ultimately, these developments
suggest a contrasting theory to Justice Black's idealistic conception of
taxpaying: taxpayers overwhelmingly self-report their income to the
IRS each year not out of some higher moralistic obligation, but
because the consequences of not doing so are steep and are growing
increasingly steeper.4 0
Although the circuits have varied in their interpretations of tax
loss under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, ironically, the
Guidelines were enacted with the purpose of generating consistency
in sentencing procedures. The United States Sentencing Commission
("Commission"), which promulgates the Guidelines, was constituted
with the purpose, inter alia, of "establish[ing] sentencing policies and
practices for the Federal criminal justice system that ...avoid[]
unwarranted sentencing disparities."41 Under the Guidelines, a
convicted defendant's sentence is determined by calculating the
crime's "base offense level," which, for tax evasion, is based on the
tax loss to the government. In addition, prior to 2005, the courts were
required to strictly apply the dictates of the Guidelines because 18
U.S.C.S. §§ 3553(b)(1) and 3742(e) stated that the Guidelines were
nonderogable and mandatory directives. 42 However, in United States
v. Booker,43 the Supreme Court struck down these provisions and

38. Subcomm. on Taxation Hearing,supra note 35, at 18.
39. See Cowell, supranote 36, at 167-72.
40. The "tax gap" is the "aggregate amount of true tax liability imposed by law for a
given tax year that is not paid voluntarily and timely" and has become a favorite target of
the IRS. See REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP, supra note 2, at 6. In 2007, the IRS
announced that it will conduct "special audits" for 13,000 taxpayers, with the specific goal
of narrowing the tax gap. See 13,000 to Get 'Dear Taxpayer' Letter from IRS, MSNBC,
Sept. 26, 2007, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20996387. The IRS's recent aim of "closing
the tax gap" further illustrates its focus on increased audit and prosecution measures. See
REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP, supra note 2, at 24.

41. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000). For a discussion of the Guidelines' objective of
stricter sentencing, see infra notes 123-29 and accompanying text.
42. See 18 U.S.C.S. §§ 3553(b)(1), 3742(e) (LexisNexis 2004).
43. 543 U.S. 220 (2005). In Booker, the Supreme Court held that mandatory
Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment because they took decisions relating to
sentencing away from the jury. Id. at 245-46. For an article highlighting the impact of
mandatory Guidelines on the courts, see Dana Mulhauser, The Incredible Shrinking
Judiciary,SLATE, Jul. 9, 2004, http://www.slate.com/id/2103685.
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declared that the Guidelines instead are considered only "advisory."'

Currently, a sentencing court may deviate from the Guidelines, so
long as the sentence is not "unreasonable."45 Nonetheless, courts are
not allowed to completely disregard the Guidelines' provisions,46 and
the Guidelines' sentencing recommendations still are generally held
in high regard by the courts.47

The previous (1991) version of the Guidelines pertaining to
sentences for tax evasion (U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1) contained an explicit
provision stating that tax loss was equal to the "total amount of tax
that the taxpayer evaded or attempted to evade."4 8

The Official

Comment to the Guidelines further stated that unclaimed deductions
were "irrelevant" to the calculation of tax loss.4 9 Thus, under the

1991 version of U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, a defendant's ability to claim
retroactive deductions appears to have been disallowed. Yet, in the
1991 case of United States v. Schmidt,5" the Fourth Circuit nonetheless

interpreted this language to allow for the use of actual loss, stating
that "a fair reading of [the Guideline] ...is represented by the actual

loss of tax revenue to the IRS."'51 The court then went on misguidedly
44. Booker, 543 U.S at 266.
45. Id. at 245-46, 261.
46. Id. at 264 (citing 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a)(4)-(5) (West 2004)) (holding that "[t]he
district courts, while not bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and
take them into account when sentencing"); see also discussion infra notes 127-28 and
accompanying text (noting that the Guidelines are still influential and the courts must still
take them into account during sentencing).
47. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Assessing FederalSentencing After Booker, 17 FED.
SENT'G REP. 291, 291-94 (2005) (discussing the effect of the Booker decision and noting
that "Booker did not alter many central features of the federal sentencing system"). See
generally Prepared Testimony of Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing
Comm'n, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 299 (2005) (highlighting the importance of the Guidelines
after Booker).
48. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(a) (1991) (emphasis added).
49. Id. at cmt. n.4; see also United States v. Chavin, 316 F.3d 666, 678 (7th Cir. 2002)
(noting that the pre-1993 statute clearly disallowed deductions in computing tax loss).
50. 935 F.2d 1440 (4th Cir. 1991).
51. United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 472 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 071273, 2008 WL 972703 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008) (quoting Schmidt, 935 F.2d at 1451 (emphasis
added in Delfino)). As a note, Schmidt dealt explicitly with U.S.S.G. § 2T1.3 (which was
subsequently deleted), instead of § 2T1.1, but the language of the two Guidelines is
substantively the same. In so holding, the Schmidt court reasoned that
[t]he choice before us is thus between punishing a crime whose gravity is
represented by the actual loss of tax revenue to the IRS and one whose gravity is
represented by the full extent of participation in a tax evasion scheme regardless
of the tax consequences to the government. A fair reading of § 2T1.3(a) supports
only the former.... Certainly [the use of an attempted loss calculation] would die
of its own weight the minute the Service attempted to collect its "loss" by asserting
a claim to all of the income reported on the.., tax returns.
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to adopt the permissive approach, even though the then-mandatory
Guidelines plainly declared that deductions should not be considered
for sentencing purposes.52
Ultimately, § 2T1.1 of the Guidelines was amended in 1993,13
with the goal of "eliminat[ing] the anomaly of using actual tax loss in
some cases and an amount that differs from actual tax loss in
others."54 Despite this beneficial purpose, the imprecise definition of
"tax loss" provided by the '93 Amendments actually created, not
eliminated, sentencing discrepancies among the federal courts.
Problematically, the '93 Amendments did not state explicitly whether
actual loss or attempted loss was the cause of the "anomaly" the
Commission aimed to eliminate. 5 Instead, the '93 Amendments
stated only that "tax loss" was the "total amount of the loss that was
the object of the offense (i.e., the loss that would have resulted had
the offense been successfully completed)."56 To this definition, the
'93 Amendments added additional perplexing language, which stated
that "if the offense involved failure to file a tax return, the tax loss
shall be treated as equal to 20% of the gross income ... less any tax
withheld or otherwise paid, unless a more accurate determination of
the tax loss can be made."57 Yet, notwithstanding the Commission's
goal of enhanced consistency in enacting the '93 Amendments,5 8 these
changes had the exact opposite effect-resulting in the current circuit
split over the role of deductions in calculating tax loss.

Schmidt, 935 F.2d at 1451.
52. Compare Schmidt, 935 F.2d at 1451-52 (adopting the actual loss approach and
allowing otherwise legitimate unclaimed deductions, stating that "the understated gross
income here is represented only by non-legitimate deductions" (emphasis added)), with
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1 cmt. n.4 (1991) (declaring unclaimed
deductions "irrelevant" to the calculation of tax loss, whether or not they would normally
be legitimate). Despite the Fourth Circuit's confounding former interpretation of tax loss
under the Guidelines, the parties in Schmidt did not appeal the holding to the Supreme
Court of the United States. Nonetheless, such an appeal likely would have been fruitless
since the Supreme Court subsequently denied certiorarito the Second Circuit's analogous
holding in United States v. Gordon. United States v. Gordon, 291 F.3d 181, 187 (2d Cir.
2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1114 (2002). Moreover, as demonstrated by the Supreme
Court's denial of certiorari in Delfino, United States v. Delfino, No. 07-1273, 2008 WL
972703 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008), the Supreme Court has appeared unwilling to resolve this
circuit split.
53. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1(c)(1) (1993).
54. See id. at app. C, amend. 491.
55. Id.
56. Id. § 2T1.1(c)(1); Delfino, 510 F.3d at 472.
57. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2TI.I(c)(1)(A) (1993).
58. See 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000).

2008]

TAX EVASION SENTENCING

After the enactment of the '93 Amendments, the severity of a
convicted tax evader's sentence is dependent largely upon the circuit
in which that defendant is tried.5 9 Presently, roughly half of the

circuits have not yet weighed in on this issue,60 and, notably, some
circuits have changed their approach subsequent to these
amendments being enacted. Importantly, these circuits have gone in

one direction only; in the fifteen years since the '93 Amendments to
U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, two federal circuits have converted toward the
restrictive camp, and none have switched to the permissive
approach.6

The Second Circuit was the first to confront the issue of
deductions and tax loss calculations following the '93 Amendments.
In dicta to the 1998 case of United States v. Martinez-Rios,62 the court
stated that the "determination of the tax loss involves giving the
defendant the benefit of legitimate but unclaimed deductions"
because doing so would constitute a "more accurate determination."6 3
In so deciding, the Second Circuit reasoned that a compromise was

necessary: under the '93 Amendments, "[a]t each level of tax loss,"
the Guidelines "prescribe a greater offense level (and thus a heavier
sentence) than the 1991" version of the Guidelines; in exchange, the
court will "permit[] consideration of legitimate but unclaimed64

deductions," which "tend[] to produce smaller tax loss figures.
Effectively, in light of the overall stricter sentencing framework
imposed by the 1993 version of the Guidelines, the court stated that it
would mitigate this harshness by utilizing actual loss and granting
unclaimed deductions. 6' This approach was subsequently adopted by
the full court four years later in United States v. Gordon.6 6
59. For a discussion of the sentencing differences between the restrictive and
permissive approaches for the Delfino defendants, see supra note 15 and accompanying
text, as well as infra note 118 and accompanying text.
60. Currently, five of the eleven federal circuit courts of appeals have not yet decided
a case on point: the First, Third, Sixth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits.
61. See discussion infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
62. 143 F.3d 662 (2d Cir. 1998).
63. Id. at 671.
64. Id. at 670-71. As a note, Martinez-Rios addressed the 1995 Amendment to
U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, but that version uses essentially the same language as the previous 1993
Amendment.
65. Id. at 671.
66. 291 F.3d 181, 187-88 (2d Cir. 2002). Interestingly, however, in Gordon, the
Second Circuit did not allow deductions to be granted, deeming their non-recognition by
the trial court to be "harmless error" because the defendant still lacked adequate evidence
to prove their existence. Id. at 188; see also discussion infra notes 82-101 and
accompanying text (discussing the administrative problems of proving deductions under
the permissive approach).
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In the years following Martinez-Rios, the Tenth Circuit also
confronted the issue of deductions and the calculation of tax loss after

the '93 Amendments. However, the Tenth Circuit came out on the
opposite side. The Tenth Circuit's initial response came in the form
of dicta to the 1999 case of United States v. Spencer,6 7 stating that the

''more accurate determination" language does not require the court
to consider unclaimed deductions.68

In adopting the restrictive

approach, the Tenth Circuit "question[ed]" the Second Circuit's
conclusion that deductions were permitted under § 2T1.1, stating,
"[w]e do not interpret this provision as giving taxpayers a second
opportunity to claim deductions after having been convicted."69 In

rejecting the permissive approach, the court stated that the
recognition

of a defendant's unclaimed

deductions

would be

improper, since the defendant chose not to claim these deductions at
the proper time of filing.70 Moreover, the Tenth Circuit said that it is
not required to grant deductions because the calculations involved in
determining tax loss are intrinsically different from those used to
establish a diligent taxpayer's tax debt.71 The full court subsequently
adopted the restrictive method two years later, in United States v.
Sullivan.72 Recognizing the inherent superiority of the restrictive

practice, this approach was subsequently adopted by both the Fifth73
and Ninth74 Circuits.
Significantly, after Delfino, there are now two federal circuits

that initially utilized the permissive approach after the '93
Amendments, but have subsequently readopted the restrictive
system. 75

For almost a decade after the enactment of these

67. 178 F.3d 1365 (10th Cir. 1999).
68. Id. at 1367-69.
69. Id. at 1368.
70. Id. at 1367-69.
71. Id.
72. 255 F.3d 1256, 1263-64 (10th Cir. 2001).
73. The Fifth Circuit has not explicitly stated that it would disallow deductions, but, in
United States v. Moore, 997 F.2d 55 (5th Cir. 1993), it held attempted loss is the proper
measure, and, as discussed in the text accompanying note 25, the court would in all
likelihood follow the restrictive approach to deductions. See id. at 59-61. Further, the
Moore court considered the Fourth Circuit's erstwhile holding in U.S. v. Schmidt and
expressly rejected it. Id. at 61.
74. In 2002, the Ninth Circuit followed the Tenth Circuit's restrictive approach,
stating that "deductions are a matter of legislative grace." United States v. Bishop, 291
F.3d 1100, 1116 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Everson v. United States, 108 F.3d 234, 236 (9th Cir.
1997)).
75. See United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 468 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 071273, 2008 WL 972703 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008); United States v. Chavin, 316 F.3d 666, 666 (7th
Cir. 2002).
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amendments, no clear trend existed regarding the role of deductions
in sentencing, and the circuits were equally split. By 2002, however,
one circuit explicitly acknowledged the inutility of the permissive
approach and adopted the restrictive approach instead.
This
conversion was the tipping point in a distinct trend that ultimately led
to the other circuits' rejection of the Second Circuit's permissive
approach and the manifest adoption of the restrictive method.76 The
first circuit to convert to the restrictive camp was the Seventh Circuit.
In United States v. Chavin,77 the Seventh Circuit adopted the
restrictive approach to tax loss without even mentioning its prior
permissive interpretation of the Guidelines.78 In Chavin, the court
justified its sudden change of doctrine by stating simply that it
"refuse[d] to ignore" the fact that "the current definition of tax loss
appears to exclude consideration of unclaimed deductions."7 9 By
converting to the restrictive approach and acknowledging the
inherent inadequacy of the permissive approach, the Fourth Circuit in
Delfino essentially followed the path blazed by the Seventh Circuit in
Chavin.
Accordingly, what was at one time a true circuit split, with an
equal number of circuits on either side of the issue,8" has now evolved
into a discernible movement toward the restrictive approach, leaving
the first circuit to address the issue (the Second Circuit) an isolated
aberration.8 In other words, when viewed against the other circuits'
movements over the past fifteen years, the Fourth Circuit's holding in
Delfino is merely the most recent act of conversion within a larger,
consistent trend toward the disallowance of deductions under
U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1. Furthermore, the courts' widespread disallowance
of deductions is a positive development, not merely because it fosters
greater consistency among the circuits, but also because the restrictive
approach is better supported by policy considerations than its
permissive counterpart.
76. See Delfino, 510 F.3d at 468; Chavin, 316 F.3d at 666.
77. 316 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2002).

78. Interestingly, Chavin was decided with very similar facts to the Seventh Circuit's
previous case on point, United States v. Minneman, 143 F.3d 274 (7th Cir. 1998). However,
the Chavin court did not even refer to Minneman in its opinion or attempt to reconcile the
divergent holdings.
79. Chavin, 316 F.3d at 678.

80. As discussed supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text, prior to 2000, three
circuits (Second, Fourth, and Seventh) adopted the permissive approach and three (Fifth,
Ninth, and Tenth) adopted the restrictive method.

81. See supra notes 62-74 and accompanying text.

Currently, the Fourth, Fifth,

Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits all follow the restrictive approach, while the Second

Circuit is the only remaining proponent of the permissive approach.
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The jurisprudential shift toward the restrictive method is a
positive development because this approach possesses superior
administrability, both for the courts and the IRS. The Fourth
Circuit's current approach is administratively superior because it
allows the court to make an accurate, provable determination of tax
loss, whereas the prior, permissive approach necessarily entails an
arbitrary and unverifiable approximation of this figure.82 As an
illustration, the statute of limitations for the criminal prosecution of
However, as
tax evasion and similar offenses is six years.83
demonstrated by Delfino, final sentencing decisions may not take
place until many years after the acts or omissions in question initially
occurred. 8' In Delfino, sentencing proceedings were not conducted at'
the trial level until ten years after the defendants committed their
initial acts of evasion," and at the appellate level, sentencing
considerations were still being deliberated twelve years afterward.86
If the Fourth Circuit had abided by its former permissive approach, it
would have been required to sort through the validity of seven years
of deductions, ranging from six to twelve years prior.8 Further, in
2007, for taxpayers with incomes of $200,000 or more, like the
Delfinos,88 a very conservative estimate of the amount of average
itemized deductions was over $108,000 (this figure accounts only for
medical expenses, charitable contributions, and tax and interest
payments).89 If the Fourth Circuit had not reversed its holding in
82. See discussion infra notes 83-101 and accompanying text.
83. 26 U.S.C. §§ 6531(2), 6351(2)-(5) (2000). These "similar offenses" are those that
share Guideline § 2T1.1 with tax evasion: Willful Failure to File Return, Supply
Information, or Pay Tax; Fraudulent or False Returns, Statements, or Other Documents.
Nonetheless, there is an unlimited statute of limitations for civil fraud or nonfiling. 26
U.S.C. § 6501(c) (2000).
84. See also Chavin, 316 F.3d at 678 (highlighting the inadministrability of the
permissive approach, which requires the court to speculate about which deductions were
proper).
85. The defendants were sentenced on April 27, 2006. Brief of Respondent-Appellee
at 1, United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-4506).
86. The Delfinos did not file taxes between the years of 1995 and 2001. News
Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, at 1 (Jan. 27, 2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/
vae/Pressreleases/01-JanuaryPDFArchive/06/20060127delfinonr.pdf.
87. The Delfinos' evasion spanned from 1995-2001, and they did not face sentencing
until 2007. See Brief of Respondent-Appellee, supra note 85, at 1; Press Release, U.S.
Dept. of Justice, supra note 86, at 1.
88. For the pertinent years, the defendants' annual income ranged from roughly
$200,000 to $300,000. Brief of Respondent-Appellee, supra note 85, at 3.
89. This figure is the average amount of itemized deductions for all taxpayers, filing
both individually and jointly. 2007 CCH WHOLE BALL OF TAX, AVERAGE ITEMIZED
(last
http://www.cch.com/WBOT2007/026AvgltemizedDeductions.asp
DEDUCTIONS,
visited Nov. 14, 2008).
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Schmidt, the court would have potentially been required to determine
the validity of over $1.5 million worth of deductions, some of which
stemmed from events that occurred over a decade prior.9"
This concern over administrability was a fundamental reason
cited by the Seventh Circuit in rejecting its prior adoption of the
permissive approach. In Chavin, the court held that accurately
calculating a defendant's unclaimed deductions is unworkable
because "it would require [the court] to create a 'perfect' tax return,
taking into account all the legitimate unclaimed deductions, which
would undoubtedly engender a great deal of dispute between the
parties over which deductions were legitimate and which were not."91
Accordingly, like the Seventh Circuit in Chavin, the Fourth Circuit in
Delfino realized that it is inherently inadministrable to require
important sentencing considerations to be made years, or even
decades, after the events in question occurred, without basing said
decisions on anything but arbitrary approximations of decades-old
"actual loss."92
Moreover, many of the most commonly-claimed deductions are
subject to either ceiling or floor requirements, such as deductions for
mortgage interest, medical and dental expenses, casualty expenses,
and miscellaneous deductions.93 Deductions with floor requirements,
including medical (7.5%), casualty (10%), and miscellaneous (2%)
deductions, are especially impracticable to calculate years later
because they first require an accurate computation of the taxpayer's
adjusted gross income (AGI) before these deductions can even be
90. This estimate assumes that the Delfinos' deduction rate would have been
reasonably close to the average of those in their same income level. Relying on the
average deduction amount of both individual and joint filers likely will not produce an
exact figure of the Delfinos' deductions. Still, this figure provides a useful framework to
illustrate the potential deductions. The calculation used: 7 (number of years tax returns
not filed) x $108,210 (conservative average of yearly deductions) x 2 (for the 2 defendants)
= $1,514,940.

91. United States v. Chavin, 316 F.3d 666, 678 (7th Cir. 2002).
92. United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 472 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 071273, 2008 WL 972703 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008).
93. Mortgage interest deductions can only be taken for property valued up to
$1,000,000 for acquisition debt and $100,000 for home equity debt; medical and dental
expenses are deductible only to the extent they exceed 7.5% of AGI; casualty and loss
expenses can be deducted only to extent they exceed 10% of AGI; and miscellaneous
deductions can be taken only to the extent they exceed 2% of AGI. See 26 U.S.C.
§ 163(h)(3) (2000) (mortgage interest deductions); 26 U.S.C. § 213 (2000) (deductions for
medical and dental expenses); 26 U.S.C. § 165(h) (2000) (deductions for casualty and loss
expenses); 26 U.S.C. § 67 (2000) (miscellaneous deductions); Sandra Block, Don't Cheat
Yourself, USA TODAY, MONEY, Jan. 30, 2003 (updated Feb. 5, 2003), available at
http://www.usatoday.com/money/perfi/taxes/2003-01-30-mym-x.htm.
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In addition, other common deductions, such as

charitable deductions, require receipts or other written verificationY
Due to the very nature of tax evasion cases, however, defendants take
great steps to actively conceal their income, and any proof thereof,
from the federal government-making an accurate determination of
their AGI, and any corresponding deductions, improbable.9 6
IRS auditor John Gordon's testimony reflected this predicament.
Gordon stated that he "was pretty confident there probably would
have been deductions" the Delfinos could have claimed, but he
"disallowed all the deductions because there was no support for

[them]."97 Gordon's testimony was cited in the Delfino defendants'
appellate brief as proof that they were improperly denied credit for
deductions in sentencing. 8 Still, the Fourth Circuit realized that
proving the existence of unclaimed deductions is a far different task

from computing an accurate total amount of those deductions. In
Delfino, the court held that the recognition of unclaimed deductions

would force the court "to speculate as to what deductions [the
Delfinos] would have claimed and what deductions would have been

allowed," which "would place the court in a position of considering
the many 'hypothetical ways' that the [defendants] could have
completed their tax returns."9 9 Thus, unlike the restrictive approach,

which makes use of defendants' prededuction income," the
permissive approach requires the federal courts to sift through several
years of tax records, receipts, and papers and decide the merits of

potentially millions of dollars worth of deductions-deductions the
94. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 213, 165(h), 67 (2000).
95. Any individual charitable contribution of $250 or more requires written
verification from the donee and a receipt thereof. 26 U.S.C. § 170(f)(8) (2000).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1264 (10th Cir. 2001) (expressing
the difficulty in achieving a precise AGI determination, the Tenth Circuit noted "the
defendant destroyed his records. The defendant would not provide information as far as
his deductions. And although the Government has records of what expenses were and
those records were turned over to the defense, there's been no attempt in the last four
months to sit down and-everything was intermingled-personal expenses, business
expenses-as to what was paid for how, what was paid for in cash. There's simply no way
of determining that with any degree of accuracy.").
97. Initial Brief of Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 10, at 33-34 (quoting Transcript
of Record at A372-73, United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468 (4th Cir. 2007) (No. 064506)).
98. Id.
99. United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 071273, 2008 WL 972703 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008) (citing United States v. Chavin, 316 F.3d 666,
678 (7th Cir. 2002)).
100. The restrictive approach uses a defendant's Gross Income ("GI"), which still
allows for personal exemptions and business expenses to be deducted, so that a taxpayer is
taxed only on income and not gross receipts. See discussion infra note 132.
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defendants actively strove to conceal from the federal government in
the first place. Such an approach is fundamentally impracticable. 0 1
The superior administrability of the restrictive approach also
dovetails with the retributive policies underlying the punishment of
tax evasion in general. From a retributive standpoint, tax evasion is a
punishable offense because it is primarily an antisocial enterprise.,'
Tax evasion is undertaken with the aim of depriving the federal
government and fellow citizens of crucial revenue while still receiving
the benefits of federal expenditures such as national defense,
10 3
government agencies, and the federal court system itself.
Moreover, on a macro level, tax evasion is detrimental to the national
economy as a whole."
Put simply, tax evaders should not be allowed the benefit of
unclaimed deductions, because "[t]he principle that a wrongdoer shall
not be permitted to profit through his own wrongdoing is
1 5
fundamental in our jurisprudence.""
The restrictive approach
recognizes that equity falls squarely on the side of disallowing
deductions, because a defendant convicted beyond a reasonable
doubt of evading federal tax law should not in turn be allowed a
reduced sentence by retroactively claiming deductions. In Delfino,
the court noted that the defendants "chose not to file their income tax
returns ....
By doing so, they forfeited the opportunity to claim
these deductions.... The law simply does not ... entitle the Delfinos
to the benefit of deductions they might have claimed now that they

101. See United States v. Gordon, 291 F.3d 181, 188 (2d Cir. 2002); supra note 66
(commenting that, even in the landmark case for the permissive approach, United States v.
Gordon, the Second Circuit still disallowed the defendant from using unclaimed
deductions since there was insufficient proof).
102. See, e.g., Konstantinos Angelopoulos & Apostolis Philippopoulos, The Role of
Government in Anti-Social Redistributive Activities (CESifo Working Paper Series No.
1427, Mar. 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=680525 (arguing that tax evasion is
an example of an anti-social redistributive activity that has a significant and harmful effect
on the macroeconomy).
103. This is the free-rider dilemma-billions of dollars make up the tax gap, and those
who do not fund the system essentially free-ride off of legitimate taxpayers. See 13,000 to
Get 'Dear Taxpayer' Letter from IRS, supra note 40. Over half of federal discretionary
spending goes toward defense spending, and the remainder goes toward funding various
federal programs, such as the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department
of Transportation, and the National Institutes of Health. For a high-resolution illustration
of the various federal taxpayer-funded programs, see Death and Taxes: A Visual Guide to
Where Your Federal Tax Dollars Go 2008, http://www.wallstats.com/deathandtaxes (last
visited Nov. 10, 2008).
104. Angelopoulos & Philippopoulos, supra note 102, at i.
105. Perma Mufflers v. Int'l Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 151 (1968).
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stand convicted of tax evasion."10 6 Accordingly, the Fourth Circuit
acknowledged that the permissive approach unfairly permits an
individual charged with tax evasion to mitigate her potential sentence
by retaining the ability to claim deductions. The restrictive approach,
on the other hand, appropriately disallows tax evaders the benefit of
deductions that would not have been claimed had their evasion
actually been successful.
Additionally, the restrictive approach is more consistent with the
general deterrent policies behind tax evasion prosecution because it
has the effect of better discouraging potential evaders from
attempting to commit the offense. Letting convicted tax evaders
recover unclaimed deductions effectively reduces the adverse
consequences of conviction, allowing those individuals to hedge their
bets when making the decision to evade. Despite the sanguine
taxpaying motivations referenced by Justice Black,1 °7 in reality,
taxpayers are inordinately wary of facing an IRS audit (colloquially
referred to as a "financial root canal"), much less conviction of taxrelated offenses.1"8 To the ordinary taxpayer, the most familiar
reason for diligently paying one's taxes is the risk of audit and the
of prosecution for tax evasion, not necessarily moral
concomitant 1risk
"confession." 9 This disproportionate fear is not a malfunction of
bloated government110 or miserly tax collectors;111 instead, taxpayer
apprehension is a necessary and indeed desirable effect of the
taxation and collection system, because it has the operative effect of
deterring those contemplating evasion.
As noted above, prospective tax evaders often make educated
decisions in determining whether the risks of detection and attendant
prosecution are outweighed by the gain realized through concealing
those assets from collection.112 Under the Fourth Circuit's prior
'
was
permissive practice, the commission of "efficient evasion"113

106. United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 071273, 2008 WL 972703 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008).
107. See discussion supra notes 1-4 and accompanying text.
108. Leonard Wiener, The Odds of an IRS Audit Are Still in the Taxpayer's Favor,But
Don't Bet the House, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Apr. 2, 2001, at 55.
109. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 36 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring).
110. See Daniel J.Mitchell, Bloated Government Threatens Long-Term Prosperity,
THE HERITAGE FOUND., Mar. 12, 2004, http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/
ed031204b.cfm.
111. See IRWIN SCHIFF, THE GREAT INCOME TAX HOAX: WHY YOU CAN
IMMEDIATELY STOP PAYING THIS ILLEGALLY ENFORCED TAX 9-10 (1985).
112. See discussion supra notes 37, 39 and accompanying text.
113. In other words, similar to the "efficient breach" of a contract, if the incentives are
misaligned, a taxpayer may realize he has more to gain by evading taxes than by paying
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certainly more plausible, because the detrimental effect of any
potential sentence would have been lessened by allowing deductions
Moreover, the
from the years in which taxes were evaded.
compromise read into the '93 Amendments by the permissive Second
Circuit unnecessarily frustrates the Guidelines' policy of
Such a compromise is unnecessary because the
deterrence.1 14
Guidelines are no longer mandatory, and a sentencing court is free to
set reasonable sentences in individual cases as it sees fit. 5 In
addition, by allowing deductions to counterbalance the '93
Amendments' stricter framework, the Guidelines are purged of their
objective of tougher sentencing, along with any corresponding
deterrent effect." 6 In essence, prospective tax evaders are further
encouraged to illegally withhold taxes under the permissive approach,
as any potential sentence would be decreased by the deductions they
could have claimed, had a timely and accurate return been properly
filed.
Contrastingly, the Fourth Circuit's current restrictive approach
produces a greater general deterrent effect, because it inevitably
produces harsher sentences for tax-related offenses. 117 For example,
in Delfino, had the Fourth Circuit maintained its former practice, the
defendants could have received sentences that were twenty-seven and
By ensuring that
twenty-two months shorter, respectively." 8
convicted tax evaders' sentences are on the higher end of the
sentencing spectrum, a stronger message of general deterrence is
exuded by the court. Indeed, in addition to consistency, 9 the
"primary consideration" behind the enactment of the '93
them. Thus, if there is a low level of general deterrence, one's incentives to pay taxes will
also be low, which may lead some to the (economically) rational decision to evade,
especially when the amount saved through evasion is high.
114. See discussion supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text.
115. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005).
116. For a discussion of the Guidelines' objective of stricter sentencing, see infra notes
123-29.
117. Institutionally, the federal courts' fiscal self-interest may be another motive for
adopting the restrictive approach, because the restrictive method generates greater
amounts of revenue in sentencing fines and penalties. If, arguendo, the restrictive
approach produced a result dissonant with the policies of criminal punishment and equity,
then perhaps suggesting that the approach's budgetary advantage would be improper.
Nevertheless, the fiscal benefits of the restrictive approach are legitimized by the fact that,
as discussed supra notes 102-11 and accompanying text, this approach aligns with the
interests of equity and fairness.
118. Initial Brief of Petitioners-Appellants, supra note 10, at 17.
119. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (2000); see also discussion supra notes 41, 54 and
accompanying text (elaborating on the reasons for establishing the Commission and
enacting the Guidelines).
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Amendments to U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1 was "deterring others from
violating the tax laws" by means of stricter sentencing.' ° This
purpose is realized through the restrictive use of attempted loss and
hindered by the permissive use of actual loss. For instance, the
Fourth Circuit held that, "if the Delfinos' scheme had succeeded, the
Government would have been deprived of the tax on the amount by
which they underreported (or failed to report) their taxable income.
It was this amount which the district court properly used to calculate
the tax loss for purposes of sentencing.."121 The court's utilization of
attempted tax loss thereby creates a powerful disincentive to
prospective tax evaders, because defendants in the Fourth Circuit will
be aware that, upon conviction, neither the amount of tax loss nor the
resultant sentences will be reduced by the amount of any unclaimed
deductions.122
Further, the United States Sentencing Guidelines were
implemented with the aim of toughening, not relaxing, federal
sentencing standards."2 3 The "disparities in sentencing," which the
U.S.S.G. and its subsequent revisions were intended to target, were
typified by those sentences that fell below the corresponding average
sentence.14 This point is illustrated by the erstwhile mandatory
minimum sentencing requirements, which eliminated judicial
sentencing discretion, but only on the bottom end of the sentencing
spectrum." 5 After Booker, however, these mandatory minimums
120. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1 introductory cmt. (2004);
U.S.S.G. § 2T1.
121.

United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 472-73 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, No. 07-

1273, 2008 WL 972703 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008).
122. Some critics may counter that defendants will not actually realize this distinction,
so no real deterrent or disincentive effect exists. However, tax-evading defendants
generally possess a high level of sophistication and working knowledge of the tax system.
If this level of contemplation goes into the decision to evade, it seems likely that the

potential risks (i.e., sentences) will be examined in length as well. See supra note 37.
123. This aim was made explicit in the federal sentencing manual:
Under pre-guidelines practice, roughly half of all tax evaders were sentenced to
probation without imprisonment, while the other half received sentences that

required them to serve an average prison term of twelve months. This guideline is
intended to reduce disparity in sentencing for tax offenses and to somewhat
increase average sentence length.
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T cmt. background (2004) (emphasis added).

124. As stated in the manual, the Guidelines' aim was not merely to provide uniformity
in sentences, but to reduce the "number of purely probationary sentences."
Id.
Accordingly, the objective of the Guidelines was consistently stricter sentences, not

merely consistent sentences in and of themselves.
125. While a disproportionately harsh sentence can also be overturned, such an
occurrence would not be based on the Guidelines, but on the Cruel and Unusual
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have instead become merely recommended minimum sentences. 26
Nonetheless, the spirit behind these Guidelines persists. Their
objective of stricter sentencing remains significant because the courts
are still required "to take account of the Guidelines together with
other sentencing goals" during sentencing, even though they are no
longer mandatory. 12 7 As a result, the United States Sentencing
Guidelines remain extremely influential and are still heavily relied
upon by the federal courts when making sentencing decisions. 28 As
laid out above, such an amendment would create uniformity among
objective of eliminating
the courts, thereby realizing the Guidelines'
129
discrepancies in the calculation of tax lOSS.
Finally, it would be inaccurate to maintain, as have the
permissive circuits, that an individual who attempts to illegally
withhold revenue from the federal government should undergo the
same accounting of taxes-due as would a normal, diligent taxpayer. 3 '
The means by which an individual would ordinarily compute his taxes
owed to the IRS are quite different from the framework under which
a convicted tax evader's tax loss is determined-primarily because the
policy behind granting income tax deductions does not support such
an application. Those circuits that apply the restrictive approach to
tax loss calculation have properly noted that income tax deductions
exist at the grace of the legislature and courts, holding that deductions

Punishment Clause of the Eighth Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. Also, as
discussed infra note 129, excessive punishment is not found often, since a sentence must be
"grossly disproportionate" to be overturned. Thus, even though disproportionate
sentences are policed on both ends of the spectrum, the U.S.S.G. were enacted solely to
police the bottom, not the top end.
126. See generally United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (holding that the Sixth
Amendment applies to the United States Sentencing Guidelines).
127. Id. at 259 (citing 18 U.S.C.S. § 3553(a)(4) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
128. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Assessing FederalSentencing After Booker, 17 FED.
SENT'G REP. 291, 291-94 (2005) (noting that the Booker decision has had a marginal
effect on the overall federal sentencing system). See generally Prepared Testimony of
Judge Ricardo H. Hinojosa, Chair, U.S. Sentencing Comm'n, 17 FED. SENT'G REP. 299
(2005) (highlighting the importance of the Guidelines to sentencing courts after Booker).
129. One concern when advocating stricter sentences is that such sentences may
potentially constitute excessive punishment. However, in noncapital cases, "the Eighth
Amendment does not require strict proportionality between crime and sentence. Rather,
it forbids only extreme sentences that are 'grossly disproportionate' to the crime."
Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 1001 (1991) (quoting Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277,
288 (1983) (emphasis added)). Accordingly, sentences reached under the restrictive
approach will not violate the "grossly disproportionate" standard, because, definitionally,
they represent a proportional amount of the taxes evaded (i.e., the offense's base level is
controlled by the amount of tax loss).
130. United States v. Spencer, 178 F.3d 1365, 1368 (10th Cir. 1999).
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are not guaranteed as a matter of absolute right.'
In addition,
deductions are generally granted where the legislature wishes to

encourage specific behavior (a tax preference), or where equity
otherwise requires.'32 In the case of tax evasion, certainly neither of
these rationales applies.
Consequently, the permissive approach to tax loss calculation is
inconsistent with the policy justifications underlying the allowance of
deductions, while the restrictive approach recognizes that the policies
and rationale behind granting such deductions do not support their
extension to cases of willful income tax evasion.133

This view was

reflected by the Fourth Circuit in its adoption of the restrictive
approach in Delfino:
It must be remembered that, in tax loss calculations under the
sentencing guidelines, we are not computing an individual's tax
liability as is done in a traditional audit. Rather, we are merely
assessing the tax loss resulting from the manner in which the
defendant chose to complete his income tax returns.134
In other words, merely because a traditional taxpayer would only pay

nondeductible income, it does not follow that a convicted taxoffender's sentence should necessarily utilize the actual loss figure.
Instead, attempted loss is the proper measure, because the court
131. United States v. Bishop, 291 F.3d 1100, 1116 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that "it is not
the government's or the court's responsibility to establish the defendants' itemized
deductions, if no itemized deduction information was offered by the defendants" upon the
initial filing of their income taxes); United States v. Delfino, 510 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir.
2007), cert. denied, No. 07-1273, 2008 WL 972703 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2008) (stating that the
defendants "chose not to cooperate with the initial IRS audit, at which time they could
have claimed deductions to which they were entitled. By doing so, they forfeited the
opportunity to claim these deductions.").
132. Sally Wallace, Itemized Deductions, in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TAXATION AND
TAX POLICY 215-16 (Joseph J. Cordes et al. eds., 1999). Business expenses are deductible
for another reason-so that one is taxed only on net income, and not all gross receipts.
See 26 U.S.C. § 62 (2000). Constitutionally, these business expenses must be deducted
because the government may only tax income, not aggregate gross receipts. See U.S.
CONST. amend. XVI. Still, labeling business expenses "deductions" is misleading because
such expenses are operationally subtracted to calculate gross income itself (receipts minus
costs incurred); they are not subtracted from a taxpayer's adjusted gross income, as are
itemized deductions.
133. This point is further bolstered by the fact that, unlike law-abiding taxpayers,
convicted tax evaders are required to pay penalties ranging from 28-100% of tax debt, and
the court may assess additional fines of up to $100,000. Thus, because tax offenders
undergo a variety of fees, penalties, and tax debt calculation, it is facile to maintain, as
have the permissive circuits, that convicted tax evaders should receive deductions merely
because ordinary taxpayers enjoy them. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 2T1.3 (2007).
134. Delfino, 510 F.3d at 473 (quoting Spencer, 178 F.3d at 1368).
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should not recognize deductions that the defendant never claimed at
the outset.
Regardless of which justification for punishment one believes is
most efficacious-administrability, retribution, deterrence, or the
Guidelines' objectives of consistency and strictness in sentencing-all
support the Fourth Circuit's adoption of the restrictive approach.
While a definite trend toward the restrictive approach has emerged
among the circuits in recent years, an official clarification to U.S.S.G.
§ 2T1.1 is nevertheless needed.
Accordingly, this Recent
Development proposes that the United States Sentencing
Commission issue a Revised Amendment to U.S.S.G. § 2T1.1, which
explicitly states that, for sentencing purposes, a defendant's
unclaimed deductions may not be considered in calculating her
sentence. As laid out above, this Revised Amendment would send a
uniform message to the courts, encourage genuine consistency among
the federal circuits, and work toward eliminating discrepancies in the
calculation of tax loss. Alternatively, if the Commission is unwilling
or unable to enact a full revision, at the very least, it should provide
an explanatory note or comment to § 2T1.1, definitively stating that
the changes between the 1991 and 1993 versions were not intended to
affect the "irrelevant" status of deductions or the use of attempted
loss in sentencing calculations under the Guidelines.135
Ultimately, the holding in United States v. Delfino illustrates that
the Fourth Circuit, like numerous circuits before it, has realized that
disallowing convicted tax evaders the subsequent benefit of
unclaimed deductions is the most prudent practice. This restrictive
approach to tax loss calculation is fundamentally consistent with the
policies underlying the prosecution of tax offenses and the
Guidelines, whereas the permissive approach, which allows for the
retroactive recognition of deductions, is erroneous, inequitable, and
untenable. Furthermore, the federal courts have by and large
acknowledged the superiority of the restrictive approach, as there has
been a consistent trend toward its adoption and a corresponding
rejection of the permissive approach in recent years. This trend will
likely continue as undecided federal circuits hear future cases and
recognize the appropriateness of the restrictive approach.
Nonetheless, even though the courts appear to be converging toward
the adoption of the restrictive approach, the Commission's objective
behind the '93 Amendments of eliminating sentencing anomalies has

135. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2T1.1 cmt. n.4 (1991).
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never been fully realized.136 Yet, this goal can finally be achieved
through the enactment of a Revised Amendment to § 2T1.1 that
explicitly rejects the use of unclaimed deductions for sentencing
purposes. Such a Revised Amendment would not only produce
doctrinal uniformity among the federal courts, but would also provide
an approach that is fundamentally consistent with the policies of
administrability, retribution, deterrence, and stricter sentencing that
underlie the United States Sentencing Guidelines.
TIMOTHY J. COLEY

136. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 491 (1993).

